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Endogenous Entry To Security-Bid Auctions
By Takeharu Sogo and Dan Bernhardt and Tingjun Liu∗
We endogenize entry to a security-bid auction, where participation
is costly, and bidders must decide given their private valuations
whether to participate. We first consider any minimum reserve
security-bid of a fixed expected value that weakly exceeds the asset’s
value when retained by the seller. Demarzo, Kremer and Skrzy-
pacz (2005) establish that with a fixed number of bidders, auctions
with steeper securities yield the seller more revenues. Counterin-
tuitively, we find that auctions with steeper securities also attract
more entry, further enhancing the revenues from such auctions.
We then establish that with optimal reserve securities, auctions
with steeper securities always yield higher expected revenues.
JEL: D44; G3
Keywords: Auctions with participation costs; Security-bid auc-
tions; Entry
DeMarzo, Kremer and Skrzypacz (2005) (hereafter, DKS) characterize expected
seller revenues for security-bid auctions—auctions whose payouts depend on both
the security bid paid by the auction winner, and the ultimate (stochastic) payoff
of the asset won by the bidder. DKS consider a setting where ex-ante symmetric
bidders receive i.i.d. signals about their private value of the asset if they win the
auction. DKS show that auctions using steeper securities—those whose payments
to the seller are tied more tightly to the winning bidder’s private valuation—yield
the seller greater expected revenues.
We extend their analysis to a setting where it is costly to participate in the
security-bid auction and potential bidders know their private valuations when
deciding whether to enter. A natural conjecture is that because auctions that use
steeper securities for payments yield the seller greater expected revenues, they
must also attract fewer bidders—as more revenues for the seller would seemingly
imply less for bidders. Indeed, the analysis in Gorbenko and Malenko (2011) re-
veals that this is what happens when bidders make entry decisions before learning
their valuations. Our paper shows that the opposite is true when bidders know
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their valuations when deciding whether to enter: not only do steeper securities
extract more revenues from any given set of bidders, but they also attract more
bidders, and this increased entry enhances revenue extraction from bidders.
We consider a seller seeking to sell an asset in an open outcry security-bid
auction. Potential bidders receive their signals, and must then weigh whether it
is worthwhile to participate in the auction. Participation is costly, reflecting bid
preparation costs, time costs, etc. In addition, the expected net value of the asset
with the potential bidder could be less than its value when it is retained by the
seller; i.e., “synergies” could be negative.
The seller specifies a reserve security, i.e., a minimum acceptable security-bid.
In our benchmark setting, the reserve security is set so that the seller’s expected
revenue given a single bidder—the only case in which it binds—has a fixed value
that is at least as high as the asset’s retained value: ex ante, the seller does
not regret selling at the reserve. For example, if an asset is being sold due to
bankruptcy, the seller, perhaps the firm’s trustee, cannot reject a bid whose value
is expected to exceed the asset’s scrap value. We also consider the possibilities
that (a) the reserve security across auction designs generates the same expected
revenue from the marginal bidder, and (b) reserves are set optimally for each
class of securities.
We first establish that in our benchmark setting, steeper securities attract more
entry and extract more from winning bidders, yielding the seller higher expected
revenues. The reasoning behind the seemingly paradoxical result is as follows.
Conditional on a single bidder, a seller expects the same revenues regardless of
the security design. Further, because steeper securities extract more revenues
from bidders with higher valuations, the steeper reserve security must extract
less from bidders with lower valuations, making them more willing to enter.
One might conjecture that this extra entry could harm a seller; i.e., steeper
security designs could reduce expected revenues, e.g., because a marginal entrant
has a low private valuation.1 This conjecture is false. Because an entrant expects
to earn enough to cover its sunk entry costs, it must be willing to bid above
the reserve security; else, it should not enter. Hence, with multiple entrants, all
losing bidders drop out at bids above the reserve security. Thus, the greater entry
with steeper securities increases a seller’s expected revenues whenever there are
multiple bidders. Further, the greater entry raises the probability of (profitable)
sale, i.e., of having at least one bidder. We extend this result to show that an
auction using steeper securities and associated optimal reserve generates higher
expected revenues than an auction using less steep securities and its optimal
reserve. We then establish further properties of auctions with optimally-chosen
reserve securities.
1Indeed, results in Narayanan (1988) suggest that steeper securities could have a negative impact.
He considers a firm with private information about the value of a project that requires external funding
from risk-neutral investors who break even in expectation. He shows that in the signaling equilibrium,
more bad types seek funding with equity than debt. As a result, firm value is reduced by the steeper
security.
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Our paper contributes to the security-bid auction literature (see a review by
Skrzypacz (2013)). Hansen (1985) shows that equity auctions yield higher ex-
pected revenues than cash auctions. DKS extend this result to a general class
of security-bid auctions, establishing that a greater linkage between a bidder’s
private information and his expected payment upon winning raises a seller’s ex-
pected revenue (Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Other security-bid auction papers
include Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2000), Che and Kim (2010), Kogan and
Morgan (2010), Abhishek, Hajek and Williams (2015) and Liu (2016). Fishman
(1989) builds a sequential entry model in which low-valuation bidders use se-
curities while high-valuation bidders use cash, signaling high values to preempt
competition.
Our analysis is closest to Gorbenko and Malenko (2011). They endogenize
competition between sellers in the design of second-price security-bid auctions.
Potential bidders can only enter one auction, making entry decisions based on auc-
tion design, not knowing their valuations of the goods being auctioned. Steeper
securities extract more from a given number of bidders, but because steeper secu-
rities extract more, flatter securities draw more bidders. We extend this analysis
to show that when bidders do not learn their valuations prior to entry, steeper
security designs draw less entry even with a reserve of a fixed value to the seller.
Thus, the equilibrium security design typically trades off between entry and rent
extraction. In sharp contrast, if bidders know their valuations when making en-
try decisions, a seller does not need to trade off between extracting more from a
winning bidder and attracting more entry: steeper security designs do both.
I. Model
We modify the framework of DKS by introducing an entry decision by risk-
neutral bidders to an open outcry security-bid auction held by a risk-neutral
seller.2 The asset being auctioned has a value of v ≥ 0 if the seller retains it.
There are n ex-ante identical potential bidders. A bidder incurs cost φ > 0 if it
participates in the auction. The auction winner must make a non-contractible
investment of X > 0 for the asset to pay off. If bidder i acquires the asset and
invests X, then it will yield a (contractible) stochastic payoff of Zi.
At date 0, each potential bidder i receives a private signal Θi of the incremental
value of the asset if bidder i wins it. Thus, conditional on the asset being acquired
by bidder i of type Θi = θ, the expected value of Zi is
E(Zi|Θi = θ) = X + v + θ.
That is, the expected value added if bidder i wins is E(Zi|Θi = θ)− (X + v) = θ.
We assume that Zi is distributed i.i.d. according to a density h (·|θ) with full
2We focus on an open outcry auction largely to deal with semantics following a single entrant. In an
open outcry auction, a single entrant bids the reserve security. Our analysis extends to a second-price
auction as long as either a bidder knows whether it is the sole entrant, or the reserve security is fixed.
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support on [0,∞), and that the family {h (·|θ)} has the strict monotone likelihood
ratio property (sMLRP): h (z|θ) /h (z|θ′) is increasing in z for θ > θ′. That is,
higher signals are good news.
Signals are distributed i.i.d. according to a distribution F (·) with full support
over
[
θ, θ
]
. We assume that θ < φ < θ¯. Thus, the net value of the asset to a
bidder may or may not exceed the retained value to the seller. In particular, θ¯ > φ
means that it is efficient to allocate the asset to a potential bidder with a high
valuation. Conversely, it is not efficient for potential bidders with low valuations
θ < φ to enter the auction—it would be better for the seller to retain the asset.
Our model allows for θ < 0: not only may “synergies” fail to cover entry costs,
they may be negative in nature.
At date 1, after receiving their signals, potential bidders simultaneously decide
whether to enter a security-bid auction (S, s (S)) for the asset. (S, s (S)) specifies
a set of bids S and a reserve security s (S). Bids are made in the form of securities
that are contingent on the stochastic payoff Zi, which is realized at date 2. The
reserve security s (S) is the minimum bid accepted under S. Let S (s, z) denote
the payment to the seller from security s when Zi = z. Bids are restricted to an
ordered set of securities, S = {S(s, ·) : s ∈ [s(S), s]} such that (i) for all s, S(s, z)
and z−S(s, z) are weakly increasing in z; and (ii) ES(s, θ) ≡ E(S(s, Zi)|Θi = θ),
the expected value of security S(s, ·) conditional on Θi = θ, is differentiable and
strictly increasing in both arguments with ES(s, θ) ≥ v + θ.
At date 2, asset payoff Zi = z is realized. If bidder i is the sole entrant, i wins
the auction if and only if it submits a feasible bid; i.e., its bid si weakly exceeds
the reserve security s(S), paying S(si, z). If multiple bidders submit feasible bids,
the winning bidder i pays with the security bid s2 of the last bidder to drop out
of the auction, paying S(s2, z).
We use the notion of steepness introduced in DKS: an ordered set of secu-
rities SA is steeper than SB if for all sA ∈ [s (SA) , sA] and sB ∈ [s (SB) , sB],
ESA (sA, θ∗) = ESB (sB, θ∗) implies ∂ESA (sA, θ∗) /∂θ > ∂ESB (sB, θ∗) /∂θ. Thus,
if a bidder with a private valuation θ∗ expects to pay the same amount with a
steeper security as with a flatter security, then any bidder with a higher private
valuation θ > θ∗ expects to pay strictly more with the steeper security than with
the flatter security. That is, the payment of the steeper security is tied more
tightly to the winning bidder’s valuation.
We first consider bidding decisions conditional on entry, i.e., on paying the
participation cost φ. The logic in Proposition 1 of DKS yields the following
results.
• If a bidder i with type Θi = θ is the sole entrant, it has a dominant strategy
to bid s(S) if ES(s(S), θ) ≤ v + θ; and not to bid if ES(s(S), θ) > v + θ.
• With multiple bidders, a bidder i of type Θi = θ has a weakly dominant
strategy to drop out at the bid s∗(θ) where ES(s∗(θ), θ) = v + θ. Further,
s∗(·) increases in θ.
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• If the ordered set of securities SA is steeper than SB, then conditional on
entry of the two highest types, the seller’s expected revenue is greater under
SA than SB.
Next, we consider the entry decisions of bidders a` la Samuelson (1985). With
positive entry costs, not all potential bidders may enter. Since the equilibrium
expected payoff upon entry increases in θ for a given auction (S, s(S)), there must
be some cutoff θ(S) such that only bidders with θ ≥ θ(S) enter the auction. For
the marginal bidder θ(S), the expected payoff from participation just cover the
entry costs; i.e., θ(S) solves:
(1) [v + θ (S)− ES (s (S) , θ (S))]Fn−1 (θ (S)) = φ.
We assume that the seller rejects bids with expected values below some fixed
vˆ ∈ [v, v+ θ¯− φ). Thus, the seller rejects bids below the asset’s value if retained,
but vˆ is not so high that it precludes all entry. In equilibrium, a single entrant
bids s (S), and the seller only learns that the entrant’s type θ is at least θ (S).
Thus, s(S) solves:3
(2)
∫ θ
θ(S)
ES(s(S), θ)F (dθ|θ ≥ θ(S)) = vˆ.
The left-hand side of (1) increases in θ (S), and from (2) it would become v+θ− vˆ
by substituting θ for θ (S). Thus, the assumption that vˆ < v+ θ¯−φ ensures that
θ(S) < θ¯ holds for all S, i.e., entry occurs with strictly positive probability.
LEMMA 1: s∗ (θ(S)) > s (S).
Proof. The left-hand side of (1) is decreasing in s (S) and would become 0 < φ
if we replaced s (S) with s∗ (θ (S)) . 
PROPOSITION 1: If the ordered set of securities SA is steeper than SB, then
θ(SA) < θ(SB): auction (SA, s(SA)) attracts at least as many entrants as (SB, s(SB)).
This greater entry leads to higher expected seller revenues. In particular,
• When auction (SA, s(SA)) either attracts multiple entrants or more entrants
than (SB, s(SB)), it yields the seller higher expected revenue.
• When auctions (SA, s (SA)) and (SB, s (SB)) both attract zero entrants or
both attract one entrant, they yield the seller the same expected revenue.
Proof. See Appendix.
3We assume that the lowest security is low enough that it does not constrain s(S). In the proof of
Proposition 1, we provide a sufficient condition, ES
(
s0, θ¯
) ≤ v, where s0 denotes the lowest security, for
equation (2) to have a solution.
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To see why auction (SA, s (SA)) attracts more entry, observe that regardless of
the class of securities, the seller’s expected revenues given a single entrant are vˆ.
However, steeper securities extract a greater share of its revenues from bidders
with higher valuations. It follows that they extract less from bidders with lower
valuations. Thus, the steeper is the security design, the more willing are bidders
with lower valuations to enter.
The seller may expect to suffer a loss when the marginal auction participant is
the sole bidder; indeed, the marginal entrant’s private valuation could be negative.
Nonetheless, even though steeper security designs draw more entrants with low
valuations, this greater entry always generates higher expected seller revenues for
any realization of bidders’ types. First, the greater entry raises the probability of
sale, and vˆ ≥ v ensures that, in expectation, this sale is profitable. Second, the
greater entry enhances competition: with multiple entrants, the marginal entrant
bids above the reserve, i.e., the winning bidder pays with a security bid that is at
least s∗ (θ(S)) > s (S). Thus, the greater entry to auctions with steeper securities
reinforces their revenue-enhancing advantages.
Proposition 1 reveals that with reserves of a fixed value to the seller, steeper
security-bid designs attract more entry and generate higher expected revenue.
Corollary 1 shows that the revenue advantage of steeper securities extends to
optimal reserves.
COROLLARY 1: With the optimal reserve security for a given class of secu-
rities, the steeper is the security-bid design, the greater is the seller’s expected
revenue.
Corollary 1 follows from Proposition 1 if the reserve for the flatter security
design delivers expected revenue that exceeds the asset’s value if retained. We
prove a stronger result in the appendix: given any reserve for the flatter design,
including the optimal one, the steeper design delivers higher revenues when its
reserve induces the same marginal entrant as the reserve for the flatter design.
This result does not imply that a steeper design attracts more entry when
its reserve is set optimally. To gain insights into when it does, we specialize to
securities that consist of a fixed royalty rate α ∈ [0, 1) plus a cash payment: the
higher is α, the steeper is the design. Such securities are common in oil and
gas lease auctions, where the cash payment is determined in the auction and
the royalty payment is set by state or federal law (Gorbenko and Malenko 2011;
Skrzypacz 2013). As in Myerson (1981), we impose the regularity condition on
the distribution of valuations that θˆ − (1 − F (θˆ))/f(θˆ) strictly increases in θˆ.
Given α, if c is the cash reserve price, the marginal entrant θˆ solves
Fn−1(θˆ)((1− α)E(Zi|Θi = θˆ)− c−X) = φ
⇒ c = (1− α)(X + v + θˆ)−X − φ
Fn−1(θˆ)
.(3)
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The right-hand side increases in θˆ, so setting a cash reserve price c (which can be
negative) amounts to choosing θˆ.
PROPOSITION 2: For the class of securities in which the winner pays with a
combination of cash and a fixed royalty rate α ∈ [0, 1), if the reserve price maxi-
mizes expected revenues, then steeper securities attract more entry: the marginal
entrant θˆ induced by the optimal reserve c∗ (α) decreases in α, solving
(4) θˆ − φ
Fn−1(θˆ)
− (1− α) 1− F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
= 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Steeper securities allow a seller to keep more of the social surplus, and attracting
more entry increases the number of positive-NPV trades (θˆ is positive by (4)),
increasing social surplus. With fixed royalty rates, there is no cost to attracting
worse types: the reserve does not affect the sensitivity of payouts to underlying
cash flows. However, with other securities, lowering the reserve can weaken the
tying of the security’s value to bidder types. Liu (2016) shows that the gain
from restricting entry of worse types can dominate the competition effect: if the
distribution F of valuations has a fat upper tail, it can be optimal to set a higher
reserve in equity auctions than in cash auctions.
Contrasting Known and Unknown Values. We next contrast our result
that steeper securities attract more entry when the reserve has a fixed value vˆ to
the seller with the analogous setting in which bidders do not know their values
before making entry decisions. Two types of equilibria exist: a pure strategy
equilibrium (see McAfee and McMillan, 1987) in which an entrant expects a non-
negative profit, but with greater entry, expected profits would become negative;
and a mixed strategy equilibrium (see Levin and Smith, 1994) in which each of
N potential bidders enters with probability q. We now show that regardless of
the nature of the equilibrium, steeper auctions attract less entry.
A seller’s expected equilibrium net profit conditional on a single bidder sub-
mitting a valid bid is vˆ − v ≥ 0. Given a set S of securities, if sun (S) is the
reserve security and θun (S) is the cutoff bidder type such that those with higher
valuations submit valid bids, then (i) sun (S) and θun (S) solve (2), and (ii) the
marginal bidder is indifferent between winning at sun (S) and losing; i.e.,
(5) θun (S) + v = ES (sun (S) , θun (S)) .
PROPOSITION 3: With unknown valuations, steeper securities attract fewer
entrants. If the ordered set of securities SA is steeper than SB, then auction
(SB, sun (SB)) draws at least as many entrants as auction (SA, sun (SA)).
Proof. See Appendix.
To see the logic, suppose that SA draws the same number of entrants as SB. As
with known valuations, trade is more likely with steeper securities: θun (SA) <
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θun (SB). Letting ∆ be the difference in the probability of trade, we show that
this additional trading probability arises for private valuations below vˆ−v. Thus,
welfare is higher by less than (vˆ − v)∆ for the steeper design. With a single
entrant, a seller’s expected net profit conditional on trade occurring is always
vˆ − v. Thus, expected seller profit is higher for the steeper design by (vˆ − v)∆,
implying that entry is less profitable. With multiple entrants, stronger results
hold: steeper securities extract more rent from bidders, so expected seller profit
for the steeper design is higher by more than (vˆ − v)∆, implying that entry is
even less profitable. Hence, steeper securities attract less entry, in stark contrast
to settings where bidders know their valuations before making entry decisions.
To further emphasize the contrast between known and unknown valuations, we
consider the possibility that the reserve is set so that the seller expects the same
profit conditional on the marginal entrant, i.e., ES (s (S) , θ (S)) = vˆ, rather than
the same profit conditional on a single entrant, as in (2).4 Then with known
valuations, the marginal bidder θ (S) is not affected by the security design—
because the expected payment to the seller given a single entrant is always vˆ,
θ (S) solves
[v + θ (S)− vˆ]Fn−1 (θ (S)) = φ.
In contrast, when potential bidders do not know their types prior to entry, the
marginal bidder’s type and profit do not hinge on the security design, but steeper
securities reduce the expected profits of all higher types, which reduces entry.
II. Conclusion
We endogenize entry to security-bid auctions, when entry is costly and bidders
know their valuations prior to making entry decisions. We first consider any
reserve security of a fixed value that exceeds the asset’s retained value to the
seller. Counter-intuitively, we show that security-bid auctions that use steeper
securities for payment, which generate greater expected revenues for the seller
for a fixed number of bidders, also make bidders with worse signals more willing
to enter. This increased entry reinforces the revenue superiority of such auctions
even when the marginal entrant has a very low private valuation. We extend this
analysis to optimally-chosen reserves; and we contrast our findings with those
that obtain when bidders do not know their valuations prior to entry.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Let s (SA) and s (SB) be the reserve securities under SA
and SB, respectively. By way of contradiction, first suppose θ (SA) = θ (SB) = θ˜.
Then,
(A1)
∫ θ
θ˜
ESA (s (SA) , θ)F
(
dθ|θ ≥ θ˜
)
=
∫ θ
θ˜
ESB (s (SB) , θ)F
(
dθ|θ ≥ θ˜
)
must hold to satisfy (2). Also, using (1) yields ESA
(
s (SA) , θ˜
)
= ESB
(
s (SB) , θ˜
)
,
which, together with the definition of steepness, implies that∫ θ
θ˜
ESA (s (SA) , θ)F
(
dθ|θ ≥ θ˜
)
>
∫ θ
θ˜
ESB (s (SB) , θ)F
(
dθ|θ ≥ θ˜
)
,
a contradiction to (A1). Next suppose θ (SA) > θ (SB). Then, it follows that
∫ θ
θ(SA)
ESB (s (SB) , θ)F (dθ|θ ≥ θ (SA)) >
∫ θ
θ(SB)
ESB (s (SB) , θ)F (dθ|θ ≥ θ (SB))
(A2)
=
∫ θ
θ(SA)
ESA (s (SA) , θ)F (dθ|θ ≥ θ (SA)) ,
where the equality holds by (2). This, together with the definition of steep-
ness, implies ESB (s (SB) , θ (SA)) > ESA (s (SA) , θ (SA)); else, the left-hand side
of (A2) would become smaller, a contradiction. Let U(s (Sj) , θ) denote type
θ’s expected payoff given reserve securities s (Sj) for j = A,B. Then, since
ESB (s (SB) , θ (SA)) > ESA (s (SA) , θ (SA)),
U(s (SA) , θ (SA)) > U(s (SB) , θ (SA)) > U(s (SB) , θ (SB)) = U(s (SA) , θ (SA)),
a contradiction, where the second inequality holds by θ (SA) > θ (SB) and the
equality holds by (1). Therefore, θ (SA) < θ (SB) .
To establish existence and uniqueness of equilibrium outcomes, we assume that
the set of securities has sufficient range on the low side that ES
(
s0, θ¯
) ≤ v, where
s0 is the lowest security. We now show that this ensures a unique s ∈ [s0, s¯] and
θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] that solve equations (1) and (2). First, by ES (s0, θ¯) ≤ v, ES(s, θ) ≥
v + θ and θ¯ > φ, a unique s∗ ∈ (s0, s¯) exists such that ES
(
s∗, θ¯
)
= v + θ¯ − φ.
Second, define θˆ (s) to be the cutoff type associated with a reserve s ∈ [s0, s∗];
i.e.,
(A3)
[
v + θˆ (s)− ES
(
s, θˆ (s)
)]
Fn−1
(
θˆ (s)
)
= φ.
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Because θˆ − ES(s, θˆ) weakly rises in θˆ (see Lemma 1 of DKS) and F (θˆ) strictly
rises in θˆ, the left-hand side of (A3) strictly rises in θˆ. For all s ∈ [s0, s∗], the
left-hand side of (A3) is no less than φ at θˆ = θ¯, and is zero at θˆ = θ; hence
(A3) has a unique solution. Because ES(s, θˆ) strictly increases in s, θˆ (s) strictly
increases in s. Third, for s ∈ [s0, s∗], denote by L (s) the left-hand side of (2)
when plugging s for s (S) and θˆ (s) for θ (S); i.e.,
L (s) =
∫ θ
θˆ(s)
ES(s, θ)F (dθ|θ ≥ θˆ (s)).
Because θˆ (s∗) = θ¯, L (s∗) = ES
(
s∗, θ¯
)
= v + θ¯ − φ > vˆ. As L (s0) < v ≤ vˆ and
L (s) is strictly increasing, a unique s∗∗ ∈ (s0, s∗) exists such that L (s∗∗) = vˆ.
Thus, there exists a unique solution (s = s∗∗, θ = θˆ (s∗∗)) that describes the
equilibrium.
Let θ2 be the second-highest type. When θ2 ≤ θ (SA), a seller expects v if there
is no entry and vˆ ≥ v if there is entry; and entry is more likely for (SA, s (SA))
than (SB, s (SB)). When θ2 ∈ (θ (SA) , θ (SB)], at least two bidders enter for
(SA, s (SA)) so expected revenue exceeds vˆ by Lemma 1, while at most one bidder
enters for (SB, s (SB)). When θ2 > θ (SB), multiple bidders enter both auctions;
and from DKS a seller expects higher revenue from (SA, s (SA)) . 
Proof of Corollary 1: We prove a stronger revenue dominance result. Let an
ordered set of securities SA be steeper than SB. Set the reserve for SB (pos-
sibly optimally, but possibly sub-optimally delivering expected revenue below
v) so that a potential bidder enters if and only if his type exceeds some θ∗.
Now set the reserve for SA so that a type θ also enters if and only if θ ≥ θ∗.
Thus, the probability of getting any m ∈ {1, ..., n} entrants is the same in
the two auctions. Conditional on any m ≥ 1 entrants, auction SA generates
higher expected revenue than SB: m > 1 follows from DKS, and when m = 1,
ES (s (SA) , θ∗) = ES (s (SB) , θ∗) = v + θ∗ − φFn−1(θ∗) by the participation con-
dition (1), and ES (s (SA) , θ) > ES (s (SB) , θ) for θ > θ∗ by the definition of
steepness. Setting the optimal reserve for SA would only further raise its ex-
pected revenue. 
Proof of Proposition 2. For θ ∈ [θˆ, θ¯], let pi(θ) be a bidder’s expected profit
conditional on θ. Then from an envelope condition (as in Myerson (1981)), we
have ddθpi (θ) = (1− α)Fn−1 (θ). Because pi(θˆ) = 0,
(A4) pi (θ) =
∫ θ
θˆ
(1− α)Fn−1 (t) dt.
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Then a bidder’s unconditional expected profit is∫ θ¯
θˆ
pi (θ) dF (θ) =
∫ θ¯
θˆ
∫ θ
θˆ
(1− α)Fn−1 (t) dtdF (θ)
=
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(
(1− α) (1− F (θ))Fn−1 (θ)) dθ,
where we use integration by parts. Thus, the seller’s expected profits are
Π =
∫ θ¯
θˆ
θd (Fn (θ))− nφ
(
1− F
(
θˆ
))
− n
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(
(1− α) (1− F (θ))Fn−1 (θ)) dθ
Maximizing over θˆ (via c) yields
dΠ
dθˆ
= n(1− α)(1− F (θˆ))Fn−1(θˆ)− nθˆFn−1(θˆ)f(θˆ) + nφf(θˆ)
= −nf(θˆ)Fn−1(θˆ)
(
θˆ − φ
Fn−1(θˆ)
− (1− α)1− F (θˆ)
f(θˆ)
)
= 0,(A5)
yielding (4). From the regularity condition, the left-hand side of (4) strictly
increases in θˆ, implying a unique solution. For (4) to hold, if α increases, θˆ falls,
so c∗ must fall. 
Proof of Proposition 3: First consider pure strategy equilibria. For k ∈ {A,B},
let pik be bidders’ total expected profits (excluding entry costs), Π˜k be the seller’s
profit, and Πk ≡ E
[
Π˜k
]
be the seller’s expected profit in auction (Sk, sun (Sk)).
Let θj be the j highest type among m bidders. Denote the distribution of θ1 by
G
(
θ1
) ≡ Fm (θ1).
To show Proposition 3, it suffices to show piA < piB whenever both auctions
draw the same number m ≥ 1 of entrants. First, since θun (Sk) satisfies (2),
θun (SA) < θun (SB) holds by a similar logic as that for Proposition 1. Further,
(2) and (5), together with the property that ES (sun (Sk) , θ) increases in θ, yield
(A6) θun (Sk) < vˆ − v,
for k = A,B. Note that pik is the difference between the increase in expected
social welfare and the seller’s expected profit Πk: pik =
∫ θ¯
θun(Sk) θdG (θ) − Πk.
Thus,
(A7) piA − piB =
∫ θun(SB)
θun(SA)
θdG (θ)− (ΠA −ΠB) .
Suppose m = 1. Then, Πk = (vˆ − v) (1− F (θun (Sk))). Plugging this into (A7)
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yields
piA − piB =
∫ θun(SB)
θun(SA)
θdG (θ)− (vˆ − v) (F (θun (SB))− F (θun (SA)))
=
∫ θun(SB)
θun(SA)
(θ − (vˆ − v)) dF (θ) < 0,
where the inequality holds by (A6). This completes the proof for m = 1.
Now consider m ≥ 2. We first show that given any θ2 ∈ [θ, θ¯], the seller’s
expected profit when the asset is sold under SA exceeds that under SB, which
exceeds vˆ − v:
(A8) E
[
Π˜A|θ1 ≥ θun (SA) , θ2
]
≥ E
[
Π˜B|θ1 ≥ θun (SB) , θ2
]
≥ vˆ − v.
We prove (A8) in 3 cases. Case 1: θ2 ≤ θun (SA). Then (A8) holds trivially:
the two weak inequalities hold as equalities. Case 2: θ2 ∈ (θun (SA) , θun (SB)].
Then
E
[
Π˜A|θ1 ≥ θun (SA) , θ2
]
>
∫ θ¯
θ2
ES (sun (SA) , θ)F (dθ|θ ≥ θ2)− v
>
∫ θ¯
θun(SA)
ES (sun (SA) , θ)F (dθ|θ ≥ θun (SA))− v
= vˆ − v.
The first inequality holds because the second-highest bid exceeds sun (SA); the sec-
ond holds because ES (sun (SA) , θ) increases in θ over
[
θun (SA) , θ¯
]
and F (θ|θ ≥
θ2) first-order stochastically dominates F (θ|θ ≥ θun (SA)). Further, because θ2 ≤
θun (SB), E
[
Π˜B|θ1 ≥ θun (SB) , θ2
]
= vˆ−v, yielding (A8). Case 3: θ2 > θun (SB).
With multiple bidders, the logic of DKS gives E
[
Π˜A|θ1 ≥ θun (SA) , θ2
]
> E
[
Π˜B|θ1 ≥ θun (SB) , θ2
]
.
Since ES (·, ·) increases in its arguments, E
[
Π˜B|θ1 ≥ θun (SB) , θ2
]
> vˆ−v, yield-
ing (A8).
The seller’s expected profit can be written as the probability the asset is sold
multiplied by the expected profit conditional on it being sold:
E
[
Π˜k|θ2
]
= E[1θ1≥θun(Sk)|θ2]E
[
Π˜k|θ1 ≥ θun (Sk) , θ2
]
,
where 1θ1≥θun(Sk) is 1 if θ
1 ≥ θun (Sk) and 0 otherwise. By the law of iterated
expectations
Πk = E
[
E[1θ1≥θun(Sk)|θ2]E
[
Π˜k|θ1 ≥ θun (Sk) , θ2
]]
.
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Thus it follows that
ΠA −ΠB > E
[
E
[
Π˜B|θ1 ≥ θun (SB) , θ2
] (
E[1θ1≥θun(SA)|θ2]− E[1θ1≥θun(SB)|θ2]
)]
≥ (vˆ − v)E [(E[1θ1≥θun(SA)|θ2]− E[1θ1≥θun(SB)|θ2])]
= (vˆ − v) (E[1θ1≥θun(SA)]− E[1θ1≥θun(SB)])
= (vˆ − v) (G (θun (SB))−G (θun (SA))) .(A9)
The first inequality follows from the first inequality in (A8) and the strict inequal-
ity in Case 3 above. The second inequality follows from the second inequality in
(A8) and E[1θ1≥θun(SA)|θ2]−E[1θ1≥θun(SB)|θ2] ≥ 0. The first equality follows from
the law of iterated expectations. Substituting (A9) into (A7) yields
piA − piB =
∫ θun(SB)
θun(SA)
θdG (θ)− (ΠA −ΠB)
<
∫ θun(SB)
θun(SA)
θdG (θ)− (vˆ − v) (G (θun (SB))−G (θun (SA)))
=
∫ θun(SB)
θun(SA)
(θ − (vˆ − v)) dG (θ) < 0,
where the last inequality holds by (A6). This completes the proof for m ≥ 2.
Now consider mixed-strategy equilibria in which each of N potential bidders
enters with probability qk for k ∈ {A,B}. To show that qA < qB, let pik (m)
be bidders’ total expected profits (excluding entry costs) given m entrants, for
k ∈ {A,B}. Each bidder must be indifferent between entering and not entering,
so qk solves
(A10)
N∑
m=1
(
N − 1
m− 1
)
qm−1k (1− qk)N−m
pik (m)
m
= φ.
Since pik(m)m decreases in m (a bidder’s payoff falls as competition rises), the left-
hand side decreases in qk. Then, since piA (m) < piB (m) for any m (from our
argument for pure strategy equilibria), (A10) implies that qA < qB. 
